A Comparative Study of the Effects of Electoral Institutions on Campaigns

Siim Trumm
University of Sheffield

Maria Laura Sudulich
Université Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract
A long tradition of studies in political science has unveiled the effects of electoral institutions on party systems and parliamentary representation, while their effects on campaigning and electioneering remain overlooked. In this article, we shed some light on what the effects of electoral institutions are on campaign activity, using data from the Comparative Candidates Survey project. While the study of electoral campaigns has exponentially grown in recent times, research in this tradition lacks a strong comparative element able to explore the role of electoral institutions on individual-level campaigns during first-order parliamentary elections. We find evidence that electoral institutions affect the personalization of campaigns: electoral incentives to cultivate a personal vote and smaller district size significantly shift the campaign focus towards individual candidates. Contrary to this, we find weak evidence of these elements affecting the range of campaign tools adopted by candidates.

Keywords: Campaign style, campaign means, electoral institutions, party-candidate relations
**Introduction**

Electoral institutions matter to a multiplicity of features of political life. The literature on electoral systems – specifically on their *systemic effects* – has explored extensively the consequences of electoral mechanisms on proportionality, the number of existing parties, and the representation of minorities and women (Farrell 2011; Gallagher & Mitchell 2005; Norris 2004; Norris & Inglehart 2001). Moreover, electoral institutions have been shown to shape the behaviour of voters (Cox 1997; Fauvelle-Aymar & Lewis-Beck 2008; Karp et al. 2002) as well as their elected representatives (Alvarez & Sinclair 2012; Bowler & Farrell 1992; Farrell & Scully 2007). Equally, the behaviour of parliamentary candidates should be shaped by the same institutions.

In this article, we explore the effects of electoral institutions on the activities of candidates in the run-up to national elections. The reliance on individual-level data to study how electoral institutions affect the campaign behaviour of candidates at first-order elections enhances the current understanding of élite behaviour and contributes to the field of electoral studies at large. While studies of a similar nature have provided us with valuable insight into the impact of electoral institutions on individual-level campaigning during second-order European elections (e.g., Bowler & Farrell 2011; Giebler & Wüst 2011), we offer the first empirical effort to extend this type of analysis to the arena that remains most crucial for political competition among candidates and parties, as well as for the electorates.

To date, most studies of electoral campaigns are based on single systems, lacking an understanding of the role of electoral institutions, while most contributions on the effects of electoral systems are concerned with their systemic effects much more than with their impact on the behaviour of political élites. Therefore, we aim at bridging these two traditions by addressing the question of what effects electoral mechanisms have on the behaviour of individual candidates running for national election.

Our contribution also directly addresses two on-going debates in the field of campaign study: the one on personalization and the other on campaign change. With regard to the former, we explore the extent to which contemporary electoral campaigns are ‘personalized’ by looking at candidates’ self-reported behaviour. Research on personalization has looked at its origins (Dalton & Wattenberg 2000) and the role played by the media (Kriesi 2012; Mughan 2000; Swanson & Mancini 1996), but it lacks the candidates’ perspective and, more importantly, an
understanding of how electoral institutions may affect it. In relation to the latter, we tap into the debate on campaign change and the evolution of campaign styles (Bowler & Farrell 1992; Farrell 2006; Gibson & Rommele 2001, 2009; Giebler & Wüst 2011), by evaluating the impact of electoral incentives in shaping political campaigns.

We find evidence that electoral institutions affect the personalization of campaigns: electoral institutions that encourage candidates to cultivate a personal vote are associated with higher levels of campaign personalization. In fact, we find that electoral rules have the biggest impact on the extent to which candidates opt for personalized campaign strategies, as the effect sizes associated with all other variables in our analysis are considerably smaller. We also find that the district-level electoral setting matters, albeit to a lesser extent, as an increase in district magnitude corresponds to a slight decrease in the extent to which candidates opt for personalized campaigns. At the same time, electoral institutions have no meaningful impact on the way campaigns are fought (i.e., campaign tools used). In line with what found in the context of the second-order European election (e.g., Bowler & Farrell 2011; Giebler & Wüst 2011), lower district magnitude and systems that give voters a greater say in the selection of candidates encourage the personalization of campaigns, but do not significantly affect the range of campaign tools adopted. In the face of all the differences among first- and second-order elections (e.g., Hix & Marsh 2011; Reif & Schmitt 1980), electoral institutions seem to equally affect national and European campaigns. The behavior of candidates running for election does not seem to depend upon the type of office they are seeking.

The article is organized as follows. In the next section we survey the literature we touch upon to guide our investigation. We then outline our expectations, describe the data and the operationalization of variables. Presenting the results from our empirical analysis follows this. We conclude by summarizing our findings and discussing their implications.

**Electoral Institutions, Campaigning and Electioneering**
Partisan dealignment, societal and technological changes have contributed to changing the nature and form of electoral campaigns. The growth in the levels of scholarly attention paid to electoral campaigns is rooted in the rising number of floating voters (Dalton 2008) and late deciders, who can be influenced and persuaded in the run-up to an election (McAllister 2002). It is, therefore, unsurprising that changes in campaign styles, campaign communication, and organizational strategies have been the object of theoretical as well as
empirical contributions (Farrell 2006; Farrell & Schmitt-Beck 2002; Farrell & Webb 2000; Gibson & Rommele 2009; Rommele 2003). However, this corpus of literature remains largely based on single country studies. As a consequence, there is very limited evidence on the extent to which electoral institutions affect campaign dynamics.

In defining the very concept of campaign and describing its development, Farrell and Webb (2000: 7) claim that ‘it seems pretty obvious that certain institutional (governmental system, electoral system, campaign laws, etc.) and cultural (e.g., localism) factors will affect the nature of campaigning and how it is changing’. Empirical tests to corroborate this claim are, as yet, scarce. A notable exception is the work of Zittel and Gschwend, who – exploiting variation under the German mixed system – show how electoral incentives affect campaign style and personalization (2008). Bowler and Farrell (2011) explore the nexus between electoral systems and campaign activity by using data from the 2006 MEP survey (Farrell et al. 2011), finding that variation in campaign goals (emphasis on candidates versus parties) is related to the effects of electoral systems. Conversely, they find no evidence of electoral institutions affecting the levels of campaign effort; put differently, no matter what the electoral set-up is, candidates work hard to get elected. This is also in line with the conclusions of Sudulich et al. (2013) who find no difference in the effectiveness of campaign monetary effort, under closed and open electoral systems, at the European elections of 2009. As such, there are multiple reasons to believe that electoral mechanisms may have an impact on the campaign process.

Following the mixed effect of electoral institutions, Bowler and Farrell (2011: 683) suggest introducing a conceptual distinction between campaigning and electioneering: the former indicating campaign strategy (e.g., maximization of personal vote over party’s vote) and the latter the type of activities chosen to attract votes. This underpins the theoretical framework of our analysis. We hypothesize and empirically test the effects of electoral institutions with regard to both processes. Particularly, we estimate whether electoral incentives actually propel a higher level of personalization (campaigning), and whether electoral institutions affect how campaigns take shape (electioneering). With regard to the former, we evaluate whether different degrees of personalization are the result of a variation in the structure of

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1 The study by Bowler and Farrell (2011), albeit offering highly valuable insight into the relationship between electoral institutions and campaign practices, focuses on the second-order European elections and is limited to explaining the behaviour of elected candidates only.
electoral systems. In so doing, we bring a new angle to a field of campaign study where ‘evidence is, at best, mixed’ (Kriesi 2012: 826). With regard to the latter, we contribute to the debate on campaign change by testing whether changes in campaign styles are due also to institutional variation.

Shifts in campaign styles have been described, categorized and mapped according to a tripartite scheme. Norris (2000) – to refer to the most accepted taxonomy of this sort – identifies (a) a form of campaign activity based on capillary diffusion of information across the territory, and various forms of canvassing, as pre-modern; (b) a model of indirect campaigning based more on mass media messages and central coordination by party headquarters than on labour intense activities, as modern, and finally (c) a post-modern phase characterized by extensive use of digital technologies and online interaction with voters. While a certain temporal sequence is attached to such a classification, these phases are not mutually exclusive as electoral campaigns are currently fought with a combination of tools. Nonetheless, variation in electioneering exists. For instance, Marsh (2004) notes that the Irish context, where the close ties between representatives and their constituents promote conducting highly localized campaigns, is particularly well suited for pre-modern campaign techniques. Moreover, variances in the extent to which campaigns make use of new technologies have been consistently attributed to contextual dynamics and systemic elements (Gibson 2009; Gibson et al. 2003a; Gibson et al. 2003b; Giebler & Wüst 2011). In the wake of this scattered evidence, we outline our theoretical expectations to then test whether electioneering depends upon electoral institutions as well as what campaign features may be facilitated (or inhibited) by variation in the structure of electoral mechanisms.

**Expectations of Electoral Institutions on Campaigning**

Individual candidates’ characteristics, party affiliation, and country-specific dynamics affect the process of campaigning (Bowler & Farrell 2011; Farrell & Schmitt-Beck 2002; Farrell 2006), and, while controlling for those key elements, we seek a greater understanding of how the electoral rules of the game weigh in. We rely on the framework of electoral system classification that has been provided by the seminal studies of Carey and Shugart (1995) and Shugart (2001) in order to test the impact of electoral institutions on campaign behaviour.

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2 Note that our study, being an individual-level account of campaign practices, focuses on the use of pre-modern and post-modern campaign activities only. A modern campaign style is a party-centric effort that mostly lies in the activity of party headquarters, and is, therefore, quite unsuited to an individual-level analysis.
This well-established measure captures three key components of electoral mechanisms: the extent to which the ballot structure is open, the extent to which voters can opt for individual candidates (by placing them in rank order or selecting him/her over others), and the extent to which votes are pooled across the candidates from the same party. The combination of these three elements is conceptualized as ‘electoral incentives’ to cultivate a personal vote (Carey & Shugart 1995). Expectations as to how those incentives affect campaign personalization are, therefore, rather straightforward: electoral incentives that encourage candidates to cultivate a personal vote are associated to higher levels of personalization (H1.1).

Testing the effects of electoral institutions on patterns of personalization requires us to specify not only the incentives created by electoral rules but also the potential constituency-level incentives. As such, we test for the effect of an extra component of the electoral set up, namely, the district magnitude. It is reasonable to suspect that the size of the electoral constituency shapes the extent to which candidates can establish personal connections with voters. The larger the district, the harder it is for candidates to canvass the constituency and to make their presence visible (Bowler & Farrell 2011). Consequently, a district of greater size should enhance the reliance on party image and lower the use of a more personalized approach to campaigning. Therefore candidates’ campaigns are less personalized in constituencies with larger district magnitude (H1.2).

**Expectations of Electoral Institutions on Electioneering**

With regard to electioneering, previous studies provide us with a number of assumptions, but an overarching theoretical frame on the effects of electoral mechanisms on campaign styles is still missing. A pre-modern campaign is characterized by localism and the presence of direct contact between candidates and voters. A certain degree of variation in the extent to which pre-modern forms of campaigns are implemented – and what specific tools are chosen – has been noted across systems (Karp et al. 2008). However, without a specific control for electoral institutions, county-level characteristics may spuriously account for what may be, in fact, due to variation in electoral institutions. To date, empirical evidence about the effects of electoral systems on campaign activities is, however once again, limited to second-order elections (Giebler & Wüst 2011; Marsh & Wessels 1997). A further element in support of the contention that electoral incentives affect élite behaviour comes from research on MPs’

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3 A detailed explanation of how the variable was operationalized is provided in the Data and Measures section.
constituency work: Heitshen et al. (2005) find that electoral incentives do affect the emphasis placed by elected representatives on constituency work. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that such variation would also impact electioneering. Particularly, we should expect electoral incentives that encourage candidates to cultivate a personal to be associated to higher intensity of pre-modern forms of campaign (H2.1). A smaller district should also produce an increase in this form of campaigning; as such, we expect the relationship between district magnitude and the use of pre-modern campaign means to be negatively signed (H2.2).

When it comes to the post-modern campaign style, previous evidence on the effects of electoral institutions is scarce, with Zittel’s work (2009) offering the sole direct test that candidates campaigning in districts allowing for direct vote are more likely to launch a website. Research on the European elections provides some extra elements to inform our theoretical expectations. In a study of voters’ patterns of online politically relevant news consumption in the run-up to the 2004 elections, Lusoli (2005) found no difference between voters in open and closed list systems. Instead, what made a key difference for voters was the variation in levels of Internet penetration (Lusoli 2005). Giebler and Wüst (2011), looking at the supply side (i.e., candidates) at the 2009 elections, however, found a positive association between preferential voting and post-modern campaigning. With regard to district size, Bowler and Farrell (2011) found that as district magnitude increases, candidates are more likely to maintain a website, but less likely to engage in blogging, and that district size is not a significant predictor of candidates engaging in direct email. There is, therefore, somewhat conflicting evidence on how electoral institutions affect the use of post-modern campaign tools. The Internet, by its very nature, transcends geographical borders (Mosco 2004). Therefore, finding no clearly identifiable relationship between district magnitude and post-modern campaigning is not particularly surprising. As district magnitude, per se, should not deter (or foster) a candidate’s online activity, we do not expect to find a significant linkage between district size and post-modern forms of campaigning (H2.3). However, with regard to electoral incentives there are still good reasons to think that they would exert a positive impact on the use of post-modern campaign activities. Various studies (Gibson & McAllister 2006; Gibson & McAllister 2011; Gulati & Williams 2007; Sudulich & Wall 2010) show how online campaigning matters for electoral outcomes, and candidates may as well be aware themselves that an online presence could only represent an asset. Moreover, Sudulich and Wall (2009) found that, in the Irish election of 2007, symbolic considerations can also motivate candidates to cyber-campaign. Candidates may not even believe in an online
campaign being an added value to win votes, but they might not want to lag behind opponents, if merely symbolically. In addition, the relatively low cost of online tools should provide an incentive to undertake online-based forms of campaigning. It is, therefore, reasonable to expect that *electoral incentives that encourage cultivating a personal vote to be associated to a higher intensity of post-modern forms of campaigning (H2.4)*, if only to send a signal to voters.

**Data and Measures**

We evaluate our theoretical approach through an individual-level analysis, treating candidates who ran for election to national legislature as the units of observation. We use data from the cross-national Comparative Candidates Survey (CCS) project⁴ and compatible Surveys from other countries⁵. We integrate the individual-level data on candidates’ campaign activities and personal characteristics from the CCS and the additional Candidates Surveys with several contextual measures, including data from Johnson and Wallack (2012) on electoral rules and information from national Electoral Commissions to describe constituency-specific district magnitude.

**Dependent Variables**

A large number of proxies – e.g., campaign contacts, monetary effort – have been used to empirically account for such a multifaceted phenomenon as the process of campaigning (Benoit & Marsh 2008; Fieldhouse & Cutts 2009; Gibson & McAllister 2011; Johnston et al. 1989; Marsh 2000, 2004). Following Bowler and Farrell’s (2011) taxonomy simplifies the empirical operationalization of these processes. With regard to campaigning, we focus on the extent to which candidates carry out a personalized campaign by promoting their own personal image. With regard to electioneering, we explore variance in the extent to which candidates adopt *pre-modern campaign tools* as well as *post-modern campaign tools*.⁶ Detailed information on all the dependent variables is reported in Table 1 below.

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⁴ The Comparative Candidates Survey project is a response to the growing interest in electioneering and the behaviour of candidates during high-profile parliamentary elections. It is a collaborative effort, combining an internationally agreed and locally adapted core questionnaire with questions that capture national and election specifics. The core questionnaire, in a sufficiently compatible shape for cross-national analyses, has already been implemented in around ten countries, including established democracies, such as Germany and Ireland, as well as newer Eastern-European democracies, such as Estonia. As such, it provides highly valuable comparable individual-level data on the campaign behaviour of parliamentary candidates across multiple countries.

⁵ These are the Czech Republic and Poland.

⁶ This approach is consistent with those of similar studies on how electoral institutions influence individual-level campaigning at the European elections (e.g., Bowler & Farrell 2011; Giebler & Wüst 2011). An added
Specifically, to assess the extent to which a candidate is engaged in a personalized campaign, we created an index out of four items featured in several Candidate Surveys. These include: i) personal campaign posters, ii) personal ads in local press, iii) personal flyers, and iv) personal websites. Taken together, personalization ranges from 0 (i.e., candidate utilized no personalized campaign means) to 4 (i.e., candidate utilized all four personalized campaign means).\(^7\)

Moving on to electioneering, an array of questions on campaign instruments and activities has been asked as part of the Candidate Surveys. From this battery of items, we identified those that represent pre-modern means of campaigning alongside those that represent post-modern campaign tools, and are common across the largest number of countries. Pre-modern is operationalized as a cumulative number of the following campaign tools that the candidate could have utilized: i) door-knocking / canvassing, ii) calling-up voters on the phone, iii) direct mailing, iv) debating with competing candidates in public, and v) interviews in local or national media. Following a similar approach, post-modern is operationalized as a cumulative number of digital campaign activities that candidate could have implemented: i) email lists, ii) campaign spots on the web, iii) online chats with voters, iv) ads of webpage and/or email address on campaign literature, and v) campaign webpages. As such, both variables range from 0 (i.e., candidate utilized none of these pre-modern or post-modern campaign means) to 5 (i.e., candidate utilized all five pre-modern or post-modern campaign means).

Table 1 summarizes the campaigning and electioneering practices of candidates by the country in which they stand for election, as well as across all candidates in those countries. We note that there is considerable cross-country variation present for all three dependent variables. In terms of personalization, candidates running in party-dominated electoral contexts tend to utilize very few personalized campaign tools. For example, candidates in Portugal where closed lists are used and voters have no opportunity to alter the rank order of benefit of this similarity is the resulting ability to assess whether variation in electoral institutions relates to the variation in candidates’ campaign behaviour during the first-order national elections in the same way as it does during the second-order European elections.

\(^7\) Candidates who did not disclose whether or not they used all four campaign means were excluded from the analysis in order to ensure that no bias was introduced to the analysis through non-response.
candidates within the lists, on average, use only 0.85 personalized campaign activities. At the same time, in Denmark where voters can cast a ballot for a specific candidate, the average number of personalized campaign means used is as high as 3.12. There is also considerable variation in the extent to which candidates use pre-modern and post-modern campaign tools. While candidates from Iceland use less than half of the five features of pre-modern campaigning (1.99), the average number of pre-modern tools used for candidates in Germany is 4.09. Standard deviations around the means are large for both post-modern and pre modern campaign tools, indicating sizeable differences among candidates within most countries.

Explanatory Variables and Controls

We classified electoral systems along the degree of incentives that candidates have to seek a personal vote, operationalized as the cumulative score of i) ballot – extent to which ballots are constructed by party leaders, ii) vote – extent to which voters are able to vote for a specific candidate, and iii) pool – extent of vote-pooling among co-partisans within the constituency. Given that all components range from 0 (the most party-oriented specification of the electoral system) to 2 (most candidate-oriented specification of the electoral system), our main independent variable, electoral incentives, ranges from 0 to 6; higher values correspond to greater incentives for candidates to cultivate a personal vote. Country-specific measures for the three components of the index were obtained from Johnson and Wallack (2012).

With regard to district magnitude, we measure it as the actual number of mandates distributed by each electoral district. This allows us to account for the fact that many countries use constituencies of different sizes, and provides a more accurate measure than relying on the average district magnitude within a country would do. Data to construct this variable was obtained from relevant national Electoral Commissions.

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8 For candidates who stood for election in a country where multiple electoral settings are used (e.g., Germany), we used the ballot / vote / pool scores for the electoral setting that applied to the specific candidate to obtain his/her electoral incentives score.

9 Countries that exclusively use SMD are the obvious exceptions (e.g., the UK), while the Netherlands is an extremely rare exception of an MMD country where all candidates face an identical district magnitude (i.e., the 150 seats of the House of Representatives are allocated in a single country-wide constituency).

10 For most countries, the websites of their national Electoral Commissions included information about the sizes of all districts with respect to the election in question (i.e., the election that the Candidate Survey corresponds to). If that was not the case, this information was obtained through correspondence with the respective national Electoral Commissions.
We control for a number of elements that are likely to affect variation in campaign focus and style, both at the contextual and individual level, by including in the model individual- and system-level characteristics that previous studies have shown to relate to campaigning and electioneering (Bowler & Farrell 2011; Gibson & McAllister 2006, 2011; Giebler & Wüst 2011; Sudulich & Wall 2009; Zittel 2009; Zittel & Gschwend 2008). At the system level, we include a measure of access to the traditional media \textit{(free media time)}, under the premise that systems where parties and candidates are given free time on TV and/or radio, their incentives to adopt campaign tools to maximize their visibility may be different from systems where access to a broadcasting service entails costs. We coded countries where provisions for free media access are present as 1, and countries where no such provisions are present as 0.\footnote{Data was obtained from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance [www.idea.int].} We also control – in models focusing on electioneering – for the degree to which Internet connections have become available for domestic households and a meaningful forum for conveying a candidate’s policy platform to his/her electorate \textit{(internet)}. In aggregate terms, candidates running in countries with more widespread Internet usage are more likely to implement cyber-campaigning, while candidates running in countries with low Internet penetration are more likely to prefer traditional campaign means. We measure \textit{internet} as the proportion of the population with regular access to the Internet at the time when the election was held.\footnote{Data was obtained from EUROSTAT [http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/].}

Moving on to the individual-level characteristics, we include variables capturing candidates’ self-perceived likelihood of electoral success, incumbency status, previous experience as a candidate, placement on the left-right scale, and ideological distance from their party. It is widely acknowledged that not all parliamentary candidates have a reasonable chance of being elected; this applies, for example, to the vast majority of niche party candidates in single-member district countries and candidates at the tail-end of party lists in countries where closed list systems are used. Candidates who believe they have little chance of getting elected are more likely to opt for the party as the focus of their campaign efforts, and to commit to a less extensive campaign in terms of tools implemented. We operationalized \textit{electoral chances} as a candidate’s self-perceived likelihood of getting elected before campaigning started, ranging from 1 (i.e., I thought I could not win) to 5 (i.e., I thought I could not lose). This allows us to both measure the marginality of each campaign and to overcome difficulties of capturing this element in cross-national settings. Moreover, the nature of a campaign may be
influenced by the relations candidates have with their party. Depending on how strong those party ties are, candidates might feel the need to distinguish themselves from the wider campaigns of their party. For example, the further away candidates’ own policy-positions are from those of their party, the less representative their parties’ electoral campaigns are of their own political views, and, as a result, the more likely they are to feel the need to conduct campaigns with highly personalized focus. We measure *ideological distance* as the absolute difference between a candidate’s self-perceived left-right position and the left-right position of his/her party as perceived by the candidate. Left-right placement not only represents the most comparable measure for a comparative study of this sort, but also the best available shortcut for aggregating multiple policy positions (Benoit & Laver 2007). Values for the variable can range from 0 (i.e., no difference) to 10 (i.e., maximum difference), with higher values corresponding to a greater self-perceived difference between the candidate’s own left-right stance – also included as a predictor – and that of his/her party. Additionally, we control for *incumbency* status as politicians who stand for re-election have considerable advantage over challengers. Incumbents, by virtue of an established personal appeal and status, tend to be better known than the challenger, and enjoy access to the office perquisites that have a campaign value, despite their non-monetary nature (e.g., Benoit & Marsh 2008). As such, incumbents should be less concerned with conducting a personalized campaign and utilizing an extensive set of campaign means (both pre- and post-modern). Moreover, we control for whether a candidate had run before (*candidate*), on the premise that previous experience shapes one’s future behaviour. Finally, we include measures to control for the *age* (coded as the year the candidate was born in) and *gender* of the candidate.

**Model Choice**

Given the count nature of all three dependent variables, we estimate Poisson-type hierarchical models that use parties as level-1 and countries as level-2 variables. Main models are presented in Table 2 below; all estimates are produced in STATA 13.

**Findings and Discussion**

As already seen in Table 1, campaign practices vary considerably across countries, both with regard to campaigning and electioneering. We now turn our focus to an explanation of how

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13 Skewness-Kurtosis tests for each variable show that none of them is normally distributed.
14 Implementing multilevel estimation techniques is vital in order to account for the nested nature of the units of observation: candidates are running for parties, which compete in national election spheres.
this variation is related to various individual-level and contextual characteristics. This allows us to describe what role electoral institutions play in determining what shape campaigns take. Table 2 confirms that electoral institutions help explaining variation in campaign practices in addition to various individual-level and country-level characteristics. It also confirms that the effects of electoral institutions are, largely, confined to campaigning, as opposed to electioneering.

[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]

Campaigning
Looking at personalization, we first note that electoral institutions provide very good predictors for the extent to which candidates opt for highly personalized campaign strategies. We find evidence that both electoral incentives and district magnitude are systematically related to the dependent variable. As expected, the statistically significant coefficients of 0.54 and -0.01, respectively, show that politicians who stand for election in countries with more candidate-centered electoral rules and in constituencies with lower district magnitudes conduct more personalized campaigns. Incentives created by electoral rules to promote oneself as a candidate are powerful predictors of individual candidates’ behaviour. As expected, various individual-level characteristics also contribute to explaining variance in terms of personalization. Specifically, we find that political experience has an impact on personalization (i.e., incumbents run less personalized campaigns than challengers, while previously unsuccessful candidates focus on themselves more than novices), and that candidates who are more confident in their chances to win a seat opt for more personalized campaigns. In addition, when looking at our control variables, we find that more rightist and younger candidates are keener on running highly personalized campaigns, while the ideological distance from one’s party does not appear to matter. Candidates running in countries allowing for some forms of fee media time are also more likely to shape their campaigns in a personalized form. Ceteris paribus, electoral institutions contribute to explaining variance in degrees of personalization in a substantial form.

To illustrate the real-world meaning of their effects, we depict predicted values for personalization in Figure 1. Unsurprisingly, the effect brought about by changing electoral incentives is the one that stands out in terms of magnitude. The extent to which candidates are predicted to conduct personalized campaigns rises from 0.12 to 2.28 when incentives to seek
a personal vote move from low to high. The effect associated with changes in district magnitude is considerably smaller, with the predicted value for personalization dropping from 0.65 for candidates in single-member districts to below 0.50 for candidates with 24 or more competitors. Similarly small effect sizes are associated also with free media time and left-right, predicted personalization scores rising from 0.36 to 0.85 (no provisions for access to free media vs. provisions for access to free media) and from 0.38 to 0.69 (far left vs. far right), respectively. The variable capturing the self-perceived likelihood of success brings about the second largest effect size of 0.66 (i.e., from 0.38 to 1.04) when comparing the behaviour of candidates who perceive that they cannot win to those who perceive that they cannot lose. However, this still remains significantly lower than the effect size associated with electoral incentives. It really is the latter that appears to drive variation in the personalization of campaigns.

[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]

Electioneering
With regard to electioneering, our findings show that the effects of electoral institutions on the extent to which candidates use pre-modern and post-modern campaign activities are marginal, if not negligible. While electoral incentives significantly affect the use of post-modern campaign tools and district magnitude impacts the use of pre-modern campaign means, these relationships are small in scale, as shown by Figure 2. Moreover, we found no evidence to support the variation-inducing role of electoral incentives on the use of pre-modern campaign tools and of district magnitude on the use of post-modern campaign means. The effect of electoral institution is largely confined to influencing the extent to which campaigns are personalized. This is highly similar to what Bowler and Farrell (2011) found when looking at campaigning during the 2009 European elections.

[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]

An additional insight from the analysis into the different types of campaign tools is that pre-modern and post-modern campaign means are not being used alternatively to each other, but
that these are treated as complimentary campaign activities.\textsuperscript{15} The positive, and significant, coefficient for post-modern campaign tools when explaining variation in the extent to which candidates make use of pre-modern campaign tools and \textit{vice-versa} indicates that campaigns are multifaceted phenomena, and that pre- and post-modern tools of electioneering tend to go hand in hand. This is clearly in line with what said with regard to campaign change being a theoretical taxonomy rather than a rigid temporal time frame.

Interestingly, and again in line with what is found in the context of the European elections (Giebler & Wüst 2011), levels of Internet penetration (\textit{internet}) represent a particularly good predictor for the extent to which candidates implement both pre-modern as well as post-modern campaign activities. Being able to reach voters via cyber-campaigning (e.g., email correspondence, campaign website) puts more pressure on candidates to make use of digital forms of persuasion. Low levels of Internet penetration, at the same time, significantly point at higher degrees of pre-modern forms of electioneering. When standing for election in countries with low vs. high levels of Internet penetration, the predicted number of pre-modern campaign means used declines from 4.47 to -0.56, whereas the predicted number of post-modern campaign means used rises from -0.70 to 0.82. These effect sizes appear even more important when taking into consideration that \textit{likelihood of success} (candidates who are more confident in their electoral chances use more pre-modern and post-modern campaign means) and \textit{age} (younger candidates being more proactive in cyber-campaigning and older candidates in traditional forms of campaigning) are the only individual-level characteristic to have a substantively meaningful effect on the number of campaign tools used. The level of Internet penetration (\textit{internet}) in the country appears to drive the variation in the number of pre-modern and post-modern campaign means used, possibly by capturing some latent feature of the domestic campaign environment.

\textbf{Conclusion}

In this article we have explored the effects of electoral institutions on the campaign behaviour of individual candidates at first-order elections. Following Bowler and Farrell’s (2011: 683) conceptual distinction between campaigning and electioneering, we found that electoral institutions affect campaigning, but do not have a meaningful effect on electioneering. Stronger electoral incentives to seek a personal vote and running in smaller districts

\textsuperscript{15} This is also in line with what scholars have found in relation to campaigning at the European elections (e.g., Giebler & Wüst 2011).
encourages candidates to put more emphasis on themselves. Where citizens are given a greater choice to affect individual candidates’ likelihood of being elected, their campaign effort tends to be more personalized.

We have extended the debate on the effects of electoral institutions beyond second-order elections, to largely confirm that electoral institutions condition campaign aims. This leads us to conclude that there is more involved in disentangling the process of campaign personalization than media and party leaders. While to date the debate on the personalization of electoral campaigns focuses mostly on the role of party leaders, our results indicate that it should feature the candidate’s side more prominently.

With regard to electioneering, our empirical results indicate that electoral institutions as a whole do not have a powerful effect on the choice of tools that candidates use to get out the vote. This would certainly be in line with the idea of standardization of patterns of electoral campaigns and the ‘Americanization’ thesis. Particularly, the advent of the Internet as a major campaign arena may have diminished the effects of electoral institutions. Engaging with forms of online electioneering has a very low cost everywhere, and the visibility gains associated to it may be perceived as advantageous by anyone who decides to run for election.

Our results speak directly to the literatures on campaigns and personalization, but they also cast some doubt on how different first- and second-order elections actually are with regard to campaign activities. The patterns we described are in fact very similar to what found in studies of the European Parliament elections; there might be more similarities between first- and second-order elections than so far perceived. While certain features of the second-order model have consolidated over time (Hix & Marsh 2011), our findings indicate that – with regard to electoral campaigns processes – second-order elections do not considerably differ from the first-order electoral arenas.

All in all, our findings broaden the understanding of how electoral institutions affect campaign practices. It is generally accepted that electoral campaigns are shaped by country-specific dynamics as well as party- and individual-level characteristics. The empirical evidence offered here adds electoral institutions to this list.
Bibliography


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| AIC                            | 13253                      | 11600      | 10164       |
| Log-likelihood                 | -6614                      | -5786      | -5068       |
| Number of observations         | 4165                       | 3356       | 3356        |
| Number of countries            | 8                          | 8          | 8           |
| Number of parties              | 63                         | 65         | 65          |

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Figure 1. Effects of Electoral Institutions on Personalization

Figure 1A. Effect of Electoral Incentives on Personalization

Figure 1B. Effects of District Magnitude on Personalization
Figure 2. Effects of Electoral Institutions on Electioneering

Figure 2A. Effect of Electoral Incentives on Post-Modern

Figure 2B. Effects of District Magnitude on Pre-Modern